EURussiaCentreEU-Russia Centre

Статья директора Центра ЕС-Россия Фрейзера Камерона в International Herald Tribune

Статья директора Центра ЕС-Россия Фрейзера Камерона в International Herald Tribune

Перевод статьи Фрейзера Камерона в International Herald Tribune на русский язык

Директор Центра ЕС-Россия Фрейзер Камерон комментирует новую книгу Рональда Д. Азмуса

BOOK REVIEW

A LITTLE WAR THAT SHOOK THE WORLD; GEORGIA, RUSSIA AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST by Ronald D. Asmus (Palgrave)

There may be a little exaggeration in the title but Ron Asmus has provided a fascinating account of the August 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia. If there is one weakness in the book, it is that Asmus relies rather too heavily on Georgian and US sources. There is some mention of the EU when it comes to the ceasefire, but remarkably little on the role of Peter Semneby, the EU’s special representative for the region. The biggest weakness is the complete absence of Russian sources. Asmus explains that he did try to contact Russians but there was a marked reluctance to speak to him. This may be because the author was already seen as too pro-Georgian in Russian eyes. Certainly Asmus does not try and hide his involvement in Georgia and his meetings with President Saakashvili. This is what gives the book much of its flavour. But it is still disappointing that no Russians were persuaded to give their side of the story.

The thrust of Asmus’ argument is that the August 2008 conflict was not so much about South Ossietia, as about Russia drawing a red line in the sand against any further NATO enlargement. He does not seek to exculpate Saakashvili for his fateful decision on 7 August but he seeks to explain the rationale for it. After months of provocation, the president believed that Russian forces were entering his country and that he had no choice but to fight. But as Asmus notes, the bottom line is simple: ‘Georgia walked into a war that it was not prepared for and could not win.’

Perhaps of more interest to EU readers is why this ‘frozen conflict’ suddenly burst into flames. Many diplomats and experts had sounded warning bells – why did no one listen to them? Asmus puts forward a number of arguments, from the dangerous precedent of Kosovo, to the lack of attention in Washington. George W Bush was already a lame duck president and his determination to push for Georgian and Ukrainian membership of NATO at the Bucharest summit was a catastrophic mistake. The EU, in the shape of President Sarkozy, stepped in to broker a ceasefire; but the six-point plan was not adhered to by Moscow and the EU did little about it.

Asmus believes that the war could have been prevented if there had been greater Western support for Georgia and more neutral peacekeepers on the ground. This judgement must be open to question. With Putin determined to stop NATO expansion on one side and the hot-headed Saakashvili seeking integration into Euro-Atlantic structures on the other, it is difficult to see where there could be a compromise.

What is clear is that all sides lost in the conflict. Georgia lost territory and civilians. Russia demonstrated its disregard for OSCE commitments not to change borders by force. NATO was shown to be weak and divided. The two breakaway republics received no recognition apart from Nicaragua.

Asmus is enough of a realist to recognise that there is zero chance of Georgia regaining Abhazia and South Ossietia in the foreseeable future. Patience and consolidation of Georgia as a proper democracy are the first requirements. But for the EU and US, Asmus has a clear message. The West needs to stand firm on the principles of the Paris Charter. There can be no backsliding on the fundamental values of democracy and human rights and no acceptance of special spheres of influence. Asmus is right, but will his message be heard?

The YUKOS Case at Strasbourg, and Russia’s Ratification of Protocol 14

This short article reviews some intriguing recent developments in Russia’s relations with the Council of Europe. It uses the example of YUKOS to illustrate recent developments.

The YUKOS oil company, which was originally state owned, grew to become the largest, most successful and most transparent oil company in Russia. In July 2003, a series of raids were carried out by Russian law enforcement agencies on YUKOS premises and on 25 October that year, YUKOS owner, Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested. On 31 May 2005 Mr Khodorkovsky was convicted of serious offences of fraud and was sentenced to nine years imprisonment, later reduced to eight years. He is currently undergoing a second trial with colleague, Platon Lebedev in Moscow.

On 23 April 2004 YUKOS lodged an application to the European Court of Human Rights Where it complained of violations of Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR (right to property) . In more detail, these complaints were:

• YUKOS had been deprived of its possessions and that these deprivations had not been in accordance with the law and had imposed a disproportionate burden on it;
• the tax liability and enforcement proceedings were a de facto disguised expropriation;
• the seizure of assets was disproportionate in that the authorities ordered YUKOS to pay, and at the same time froze the its assets, worth considerably more than its then liability;
• the time of merely a couple of days given to YUKOS for payment was absurdly short
• the sale of OAO Yuganskneftegaz was unlawful, conducted at a gross undervaluation through a plainly controlled auction, with the participation of a sham bidder, OOO Baykalfinansgrup;

On 29 January 2009, the Court held that YUKOS’ application was partly admissible. Although the Court has yet to make its findings on the merits, this may be taken as a strong indication that YUKOS may well win.

There will be an oral hearing in this case. Initially, the hearing was to take place on 19 November 2009. However, on 20 October 2009, Russia announced the appointment of a new judge ad hoc to sit on the case, after the first person appointed, St Petersburg Professor Valerii Musin, recused himself as he had been made a director of Russian state-owned Gazprom. The new appointee was not even a professor, but a Senior Lecturer of the same university, Andrei Bushev, who had studied with President Medvedev. Russia then sought and was granted a further adjournment until 14 January 2010, to enable the new judge to familiarise himself with the case file.

However, on 13 January 2010 the Court announced, at the last possible moment, yet another adjournment at the request of Russia, this time to 4 March 2010. The grounds for Russia’s request were two-fold. Mr Bushev was said to be in ill-health; and the Russian Agent (Plenipotentiary) at Strasbourg, Georgii Matyushkin, was said to be obliged to return to Moscow as the State Duma was to vote, on 15 January, on ratification by Russia of Protocol 14 to the ECHR, on the reform of the Court – the last of the Council of Europe’s 47 member states to do so, following a very long delay of six years. The Law on Ratification, signed by President Medvedev, was published in the official Rossiiskaya Gazeta on 8 February 2010.

There is intense speculation by informed Russian commentators that the continued delay is the result of an attempt by Russia to ratify Protocol 14 before any hearing, in the hope of obtaining from the Court a quid pro quo, in the form of a more favourable judgment.

The leading legal affairs journalist, Olga Pleshanova, reported these rumours, strongly denied by Russia, in the daily Kommersant on 14 January 2010, and also reported that on 18 December 2009 Mr Matyushin had used a conference at the Russian Academy of Justice held to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Strasbourg court, to launch a strong attack on the European Court of Human Rights. He spoke of contradictory decisions of the Court, in which it had first recognised the competence of an applicant company, despite the objections of the respondent state, and then done the opposite. Although he did not name the case, it was clear to all that he was referring precisely to the YUKOS case, and Russia’s insistence that YUKOS should be represented by the liquidator, Mr Rebgun.

In late December 2009 President Medvedev presented to the State Duma a package of draft laws to reform the judicial system on the recommendations of the Council of Europe, including the creation of courts of appeal. In Pleshanova’s view, Russia hopes that the hearing on 4 March will take place against the background of unprecedented Russian compliance with the CoE’s wishes.

It may well be that these manoeuvres are evidence of profound Russian disquiet as to the likely outcome of the YUKOS application.

Центр Карнеги: Медведев подбил ЕС высказаться, как обустроить Россию

«СП»: – Как теперь может развиваться ситуация?
Эксперт Московского центра Карнеги Николай Петров: Мне кажется, развитие может пойти по двум сценариям. Один – тот, который продемонстрировали чиновники МИДа. То есть делать удивленное лицо и сказать: господа, мы просили от вас денег, инвестиций и технологических секретов. А что они не будет работать, пока мы не установим систему взаимного доверия между бизнесом, государством и обществом, не укрепим судебную, и не модернизируем политическую системы, – об этом беспокоиться не надо, это наше внутреннее дело. В этом случае дело выльется в диалог между Россией и ЕС в режиме обмена какими-то декларациями.
«СП»: – А второй сценарий?
– Второй – все-таки часть нашей политической элиты проникается тем, что нынешняя политическая система не соответствует задачам, которые стоят перед страной, и должна быть модернизирована. В направлении, которое показывает доклад ИНСОР, или в каком-то другом – но она должна быть сложнее, эффективнее. Она должна быть адекватной поставленным перед страной задачам. Тогда можно посмотреть на замечания, предложения и пожелания Евросоюза, как на советы внешнего, благожелательного эксперта, успешного в плане модернизации и технологического развития Европы. Здесь возможно налаживать сотрудничество по совершенно конкретным сюжетам, в том числе с совершенствованием судебной системы и усложнением системы политической.