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Директор Центра ЕС-Россия Фрейзер Камерон комментирует новую книгу Рональда Д. Азмуса

BOOK REVIEW

A LITTLE WAR THAT SHOOK THE WORLD; GEORGIA, RUSSIA AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST by Ronald D. Asmus (Palgrave)

There may be a little exaggeration in the title but Ron Asmus has provided a fascinating account of the August 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia. If there is one weakness in the book, it is that Asmus relies rather too heavily on Georgian and US sources. There is some mention of the EU when it comes to the ceasefire, but remarkably little on the role of Peter Semneby, the EU’s special representative for the region. The biggest weakness is the complete absence of Russian sources. Asmus explains that he did try to contact Russians but there was a marked reluctance to speak to him. This may be because the author was already seen as too pro-Georgian in Russian eyes. Certainly Asmus does not try and hide his involvement in Georgia and his meetings with President Saakashvili. This is what gives the book much of its flavour. But it is still disappointing that no Russians were persuaded to give their side of the story.

The thrust of Asmus’ argument is that the August 2008 conflict was not so much about South Ossietia, as about Russia drawing a red line in the sand against any further NATO enlargement. He does not seek to exculpate Saakashvili for his fateful decision on 7 August but he seeks to explain the rationale for it. After months of provocation, the president believed that Russian forces were entering his country and that he had no choice but to fight. But as Asmus notes, the bottom line is simple: ‘Georgia walked into a war that it was not prepared for and could not win.’

Perhaps of more interest to EU readers is why this ‘frozen conflict’ suddenly burst into flames. Many diplomats and experts had sounded warning bells – why did no one listen to them? Asmus puts forward a number of arguments, from the dangerous precedent of Kosovo, to the lack of attention in Washington. George W Bush was already a lame duck president and his determination to push for Georgian and Ukrainian membership of NATO at the Bucharest summit was a catastrophic mistake. The EU, in the shape of President Sarkozy, stepped in to broker a ceasefire; but the six-point plan was not adhered to by Moscow and the EU did little about it.

Asmus believes that the war could have been prevented if there had been greater Western support for Georgia and more neutral peacekeepers on the ground. This judgement must be open to question. With Putin determined to stop NATO expansion on one side and the hot-headed Saakashvili seeking integration into Euro-Atlantic structures on the other, it is difficult to see where there could be a compromise.

What is clear is that all sides lost in the conflict. Georgia lost territory and civilians. Russia demonstrated its disregard for OSCE commitments not to change borders by force. NATO was shown to be weak and divided. The two breakaway republics received no recognition apart from Nicaragua.

Asmus is enough of a realist to recognise that there is zero chance of Georgia regaining Abhazia and South Ossietia in the foreseeable future. Patience and consolidation of Georgia as a proper democracy are the first requirements. But for the EU and US, Asmus has a clear message. The West needs to stand firm on the principles of the Paris Charter. There can be no backsliding on the fundamental values of democracy and human rights and no acceptance of special spheres of influence. Asmus is right, but will his message be heard?