Российские власти обвиняют внука лидера американской Компартии Уильяма Браудера в уклонении от уплаты налогов. Сам Браудер, который более десяти лет занимался бизнесом в России, рассказал Илье Архипову, что это силовики похитили налоги, уплаченные компаниями фонда Hermitage.
- Кто виноват в том, что из всех стран Западной Европы у России самые плохие отношения именно с Великобританией?
- Вы недооцениваете наши двусторонние отношения и исходите только из того, что у нас есть разногласия по одному или двум вопросам. Наши разногласия хорошо известны, они очень серьезные и до сих пор никуда не делись. Но взаимоотношения между Россией и Великобританией все же намного шире. Если вы посмотрите на наше сотрудничество, например, в торговле, инвестициях, культуре и туризме – оно крайне продуктивное. Как члены Совбеза ООН, G8 и G20, мы вместе занимаемся возникающими перед нами проблемами. В первую очередь – кризисом и трудностями с занятостью, которые сдерживают экономический рост. А еще международными проблемами, такими как Иран, Афганистан, Пакистан, Ближневосточный мирный процесс или изменение климата. Думаю, что мы можем извлечь немало пользы от этой совместной работы.
-Новая американская администрация дала понять, что будет гораздо мягче относиться к тому, что происходит с правами человека в России. Вы придерживаетесь той же линии?
- Не мне комментировать российско-американские отношения. Это действительно первый за несколько лет визит британского министра иностранных дел в Россию. Но при этом Россия и Британия все время общаются друг с другом на высшем уровне. В последний раз я встречался с Сергеем Лавровым в Нью-Йорке всего месяц назад, а наш премьер-министр регулярно видится с президентом Медведевым – в последний раз это было в Питсбурге в сентябре. А на этой неделе министр финансов Алексей Кудрин будет в Лондоне на переговорах по торговле и инвестициям с лордом Мандельсоном.
Первый за последние пять лет визит в Россию главы МИД Великобритании Дэвида Милибанда не привел к устранению противоречий в отношениях между Москвой и Лондоном. Вчера господин Милибанд и его российский коллега Сергей Лавров по итогам переговоров подписали лишь три пространных заявления о мировых проблемах, а двусторонние вопросы вроде “дела Лугового” или работы в РФ Британского совета так и остались нерешенными. По итогам визита едва ли не единственным позитивным моментом в отношениях за последнее время Дэвид Милибанд назвал переход Андрея Аршавина в “Арсенал”.
Источник: КоммерсантФранцузский концерн Renault, которому российские власти настойчиво посоветовали финансово поддержать «АвтоВАЗ», вчера сообщил, что поддерживает перестройку близкого к банкротству автозавода, но отказывает просьбам Москвы о вливании крупных денежных средств в предприятие. Об этом рассказал в Париже Патрик Пелата, операционный директор Renault, владеющего блокирующим пакетом акций российского автогиганта. «Они бы хотели, чтобы мы влили много денег, поскольку «АвтоВАЗу» нужны деньги, но у нас нет крупных сумм. Мы сказали им, что не можем вкладывать дополнительные средства в совместное предприятие», — сказал г-н Пелата агентству Reuters.
Источник: Время новостейВчера премьер-министр России Владимир Путин принимал в правительственной резиденции на улице Воздвиженка своего датского коллегу Ларса Лекке Расмуссена. Во время общения глав правительств с прессой стало очевидно, что премьеры хотя и обозначают широкий круг общих интересов, акцент все же делают на разных вещах. Г-н Путин все больше благодарил за разрешение на строительство «Северного потока» и агитировал другие страны следовать примеру Дании, а Ларс Лекке Расмуссен обращал внимание на экологические вопросы и проблему изменения климата. … Владимир Путин разъяснил позицию, с которой Россия выйдет на международную конференцию по проблемам климатических изменений: «Все страны, особенно крупнейшие экономики мира, которые осуществляют наибольшие выбросы, должны подписаться под этим документом без исключения. … ”
Источник: Время новостейPresident Dmitry Medvedev was dressed in black and abstained from smiling in the presence of TV-cameras when he met leaders of four parliamentary parties at his residence. The meeting was at the request of the three opposition parties (Communists, Just Russia and Liberal-Democrats) who were united in their protests at massive falsifications in the October 11 regional elections.
In an unprecedented gesture in modern Russian history, these three parties even organised a temporary boycott of a parliamentary session on October 14, in what appeared to be an unpleasant surprise for the Kremlin, which is used to treating these parties as obedient, political puppets.
During the meeting, President Medvedev sat on one side of the table with the deputy head of his administration Vladislav Surkov (responsible for dealing with political parties) and three top-level leaders of the ruling party “United Russia”, while three leaders of the opposition were sat on the opposite side. For Medvedev this was quite a delicate situation, because it was almost impossible for him to stand up to the United Russia in his role as a higher status objective arbiter. To do so would have been seen as a personal challenge to Vladimir Putin, the leader of the ruling party. On the other hand, it would have been also q difficult for Mr Medvedev to totally ignore the protests of the opposition, who had appealed to him as a guarantor of the Constitution.
First of all, the level of falsification in the October 11 regional elections was unprecedented in modern Russian history. Even in Moscow, where previous electoral manipulations lagged far behind cynical methods practiced in national republics like Chechnya or Baskiria, this time the authorities “closed” the gap and threw away all decorum. Officials did everything in their power to prevent opposition candidates from registering as early on as the signature collection stage. All those candidates who might prove uncomfortable to Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, were taken off the ballot lists. As a result, United Russia won 32 out of the 35 seats in the Moscow city Duma (there at least two parties should be represented in order for the Duma to be legitimate, according to the law).
On the eve of the elections and on the day of the vote itself, several methods of falsification were used by the authorities: 1. voting ahead of schedule, “early voting”. Usually such a vote is not covered by independent and opposition observers and this gave the ruling party three to five per cent. 2. Absentee ballot. According to the law, any person who can’t vote on the day of elections at the polling station where he is registered, may complete a special form which removes him from the electoral list in his district of residence, and allows him to vote at any other polling station whenever he wishes. Despite the provision that such a form allows voting only once outside the voter’s place of residence, prepaid activists (they were paid from 55 to 2000 roubles per day during the elections) used them multiple times. This, of course, with the consent and cooperation of electoral officials. Experts say that this method usually adds five to seven per cent illegal votes for the ruling party. 3) The so-called “carousel” system allows busloads of passengers to travel from district to district to cast their votes repeatedly.
Independent or opposition observers, even if they are present and actively try to monitor the process of voting, usually can’t catch t violators in person, because it is quite impossible to check whether all those presenting their passports to members of electoral commissions (to get the ballot forms), then signing the register book as themselves rather than an absent citizen. “The carousel” system usually accounts for another seven to eight per cent of illegal votes for the ruling party. 4) “Throwing in”. This is the most “effective” method. It is used by members of electoral commissions, under the orders of the ruling party, they simply throw dozens and dozens of ballots marked for the ruling party into the ballot boxes just before the closure of polling stations as the level of electoral activity becomes clear. This method gave the United Russia from 20 to 30% of final votes in Moscow alone according to independent experts and observers. 5) “Drawing the results”. The most primitive method, it is practiced in regions with notably authoritarian forms of government (Chechnya, for instance). In such a case there is no need at all to count, to cast, to throw in or to manipulate the ballots, because members of territorial or republican electoral commission simply fill in the final forms with numbers that have been “strongly recommended” by higher officials. Experts say that such a method was widely used this time in Mari El republic, where during the 2004 elections the United Russia got only about 30% of the votes, but now, in the time of economic crisis, they easily gained almost 70%. Officially.
After it turned out that the ruling party no longer id t observes any rules of propriety in collecting more and more votes in its favour during each consecutive election, the opposition rose up, foreseeing that there would be no room in politics for any opposition anymore, or as early as the next federal parliamentary elections of 2011. All three parliamentary opposition parties demanded the resignation of the country’s election chief, Vladimir Churov. The Communists also demanded that Leonid Markelov, governor of the Volga Republic of Mari El, resign over alleged election fraud.
The ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party demanded a nationwide recount and State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov’s resignation. It also said that the polls in Moscow, Central Russia’s Tula Region and the Republic of Mari El should be declared invalid, and a new vote should be scheduled for March 2010. The Just Russia party leader and speaker of the Federation Council, Sergey Mironov, believes that the current system of electoral legislation does not meet the requirements needed for the development of the Russian political system. Mironov reported that his party had drawn up a set of legislative proposals to this effect. In particular, one of the proposals is to abolish early voting, which “has become pointless since the threshold of voter turnout was abolished”. He is also in favour of consolidating a procedure on a legislative level, whereby lists of citizens who have voted would be published on the websites of regional electoral commissions within three days of the end of elections. This would help each voter to check whether or not anyone else has used his vote.
Imagine that most of these proposals were made effective. This would instantly put an end to the one-party political monopoly of the United Russia – the party headed by Vladimir Putin.
On the other hand, Mr Medvedev made a surprisingly strong claim for leadership several weeks ago in his article “Go, Russia!” arguing that the country could only overcome the devastating recession by breaking the pattern of “endemic corruption.” One can’t deny that “endemic corruption” in Russian economy comes hand in hand with “endemic corruption” in Russian political life, i.e. elections, judicial and administrative systems. How can anyone separate one from another? How could anyone even try to fight the first without curbing the other? How can anyone hope to modernise society while such a corrupt and thus inefficient state apparatus is in place? Any alien observer would ask a – “Is Medvedev serious in his declared intentions on modernisation?”
But there is a very important point. And that is – the silence and passivity of Russian society. Apart from the verbal revolt of the parliamentary opposition there was almost no public or street protest against the fraudulent elections. There was nothing similar to the street revolts in Teheran (after the recent presidential elections), nor anything like the short-lived but energetic protests which sometimes occurred in some post-Soviet states. The Russians keep quiet. They do not care about the state of democracy, either in their own region, or on the federal level. And that is the Russia which it would be senseless to lecture about human rights and instruct on better ways of following electoral proceedings. That is the Russia with which it is too premature to speak about “common European values”. Because, so far only two of those values are shared with Europe. And those are oil and gas.
On 15th October Olena Prystayko, research fellow of the EU-Russia Centre and Arkady Moshes, Programme Director of the Research programme on Russia in region and global context at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, took part in an expert discussion organised by the Heinrich Boell Foundation in Warsaw, “Eastern Partnership and Russia: a Risk of a New Division Line in Europe?”. The discussion was attended by 35 Polish experts, representing official and research institutions, media and universities.
Opening the discussion, Mr. Moshes stressed that fragmentation of the post-Soviet space and Eastern Partnership (EaP) region had increased recently. Both Russia and the EU had a restricted set of instruments at their disposal to control this process. They also had limited influence in the region. Russia had a generally negative attitude towards the Eastern Partnership of the EU for two reasons: Instrumental – Russia was trapped in a “double refusal gap”. Having rejected the European Neighbourhood Policy, Russia could no longer participate in the EaP. The second reason was systemic – Russia did not like policies which it had not lead or participated in. Additionally, EU and Russia interests did not coincide in this region. The main question was over the readiness of the EU and Russia to face conflict in the region. Both players had the resources to participate in conflict, but were not ready to use them. The EU should raise its presence in the region through the implementation of a number of projects; an increased level of EU presence would mean a reduced potential for conflict with Russia.
Ms. Prystayko gave an overview of the EaP region in terms of democratic development. In “Nations in Transit 2009” (published by Freedom House), only two countries,– Georgia and Ukraine, were classified as having “transitional governance or hybrid regime”. Armenia and Moldova were considered as “semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes”, while Azerbaijan and Belarus were already “consolidated authoritarian regimes”. Russia also had been put into the category of consolidated authoritarian regimes. Different political systems determined the attitudes that the partners have towards EU: EaP policy. Ways to engage Russia in the implementation of the EaP and general cooperation with the EU in the regions were restricted. There was little hope that Russia would be cooperative in the region under the current political system. The EU, nevertheless, should continue its current policy and dialogue with Russia. EU policy should be twofold: continuing efforts in promoting democracy in the region, and strengthening cooperation with Russia.
The discussion which followed focused on seeking options of engaging Russia in the implementation of the Eastern Partnership, different dimensions of the policy and its implementation, such as energy, security, as well as financial mechanisms. Summing up the discussion, moderator Maria Przelomiec, a journalist from TVP Info, said that the topics were important and it made sense to continue discussions in the future.
On 14-15th October the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) together Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation (CCRF) organised a joint workshop, “Involving Civil Society in the EU-Russia Relations”. The first workshop took place in Moscow and Olena Prystayko, research fellow at the EU-Russia Centre spoke in one of the sessions.
The overall objective of the workshop was to foster an exchange of information and experiences in order to have better understanding of the political, economic and social situations in the EU and Russia. In addition, both institutions are seeking to work closer together in order to monitor jointly the negotiation of the new EU-Russia agreement and to ensure that the positions of civil society organisations are taken into account throughout these negotiations and in future relations.
Around 50 participants took part in the workshop: members of the EESC and CCRF, representatives of the European Commission and the European Parliament, representatives of the Permanent Mission the Russian Federation to the EU and experts from a number of institutions and organisations.
The Workshop was opened by Mario Sepi, President of the EESC and Evgeniy Velikhov, President of the CCRF, who both spoke about the importance of incorporating civil society structures from both sides into official EU-Russia relations. In his opening remarks, Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the EC, said that he was pleased to participate in this event which was focused on consultations regarding civil society. He drew special attention to Russia’s steps in tackling the financial crisis. According to Mr Chizhov, the future lay in transparent politics, based, among other things, on expert independent opinion. Newly appointed Chair of the European Parliament Delegation to the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, Knut Fleckenstein noted that it was crucial to improve the quality of the relationship between Russia and the EU during the current negotiations on the new agreement.
Michael Webb, Deputy Head of Unit Russia and Northern Dimension (DG RELEX, European Commission) and Alexander Krestiyanov, Deputy Head of the Mission, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the EU were key speakers in the first session. They both spoke about the process of negotiation of the new agreement and the results so far. Mr Webb reported steady progress on understanding between the parties, though noted that much still was to be done. He especially noted that any extension of the negotiations would not lead to any legal vacuum in the relationship, as it had been agreed that the existing PCA would remain in force until the new agreement came into force. He outlined main points of the EU’s negotiating position and noted that most work needed to be done in the areas of trade and economic relations, energy (despite Russia’s withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty), horizontal issues and adherence to international commitments in the sphere of human rights. The EU, according to Mr Webb was open for cooperation for the civil society. He ended saying that the agreement would not be reached in the near future. Mr Krestiyanov, outlined the Russian position in the negotiations and listed some problematic issues. Some of these were simple, such as translation problems, but also deep-rooted misunderstandings. In the energy sphere, Russia questioned EU’s reciprocity. Mr Krestiyanov echoed Mr Webb saying that the biggest problems lay in the trade and economic area. After the formation of the custom union with Belarus and Kazakhstan on 1st January 2010 Russia will not be able to hold negotiations with the EU on the creation of the Free Trade Area any longer. Therefore, it was crucial to find a new appropriate form of negotiations. The EU and Russia should expect lengthy negotiations in the months ahead.
The second part of the first session was devoted to the role of the civil society in the new EU-Russia agreement. Ivan Voleš, President of the EESC Eastern Neighbours Contact Group and member of the Employers Group, EESC outlined the EESC position regarding the options to integrate civil society into official EU-Russia relations, like involvement into the negotiation process, elaborating joint positions on important issues in the negotiations and the future creation of a joint consultative body within the institutional structure of the EU-Russia official dialogue. Vyacheslav Nikonov, Chairman of the Inter-Commission Working Group on International Affairs, CCRF stated that the current PCA did not contain any reference to the civil society. He outlined the main principles of civil society which could be included in the new agreement. They included commitment to democracy (but with the understanding that there is no ideal democracy), support of a civil society, legislation on the free development of NGOs etc. He echoed Mr Voleš’s idea of the creation of a joint consultative body, based on the EESC and CCRF. Mr Nikonov concluded that civil society ties between the parties should be enforced even without the current negotiation process. Olena Prystayko, Research fellow, EU-Russia Centre spoke of the importance of including independent NGOs and think-tanks in the EU-Russia dialogue. She noted that the EU and Russia had not yet agreed their positions regarding the inclusion of civil society structures in the negotiation process, and their future role in EU-Russia official dialogue. Ms Prystayko outlined possible options for including provisions on civil society into the new agreement and the grounds for it. She supported the idea of the creation of a joint civil society body which could be integrated into the institutional structure of EU-Russia official dialogue. The EU-Russia Centre provided the organisers of the workshop with a briefing document, “What Role for Civil Society in the Sew EU-Russia Agreement?”.
The second day of the workshop was devoted to the social consequences of the economic crisis.
The workshop programme can be found at the EESC’s website:
www.eesc.europa.eu/sections/rex/europe/areaactivities/newneighbours/docs/2009-10-14-CCRF/programme-en.doc